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CASE COMMENTS

CIVIL PROCEDURE: VACATING DEFAULT- A POUND OF CURE
FOR AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION
Edwards v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 271 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1972)

Petitioner filed a complaint alleging negligence by respondent city in the
maintenance of a fence at a municipal golf course. When the answer became
overdue,' petitioner procured a default order2 from the circuit court. Two

weeks later, respondent moved to vacate the default under Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.540(b).3 A supporting affidavit 4 attributed the delay to re-

spondent's insurance carrier, whose claims supervisor had received the suit
papers but had failed to mark the complaint "Urgent" in accord with stand-

ard operating procedures. The circuit court granted respondent's motion to
vacate and the district court affirmed. 5 In a 4-1 decision the Florida supreme

court affirmed the district court and HELD, misplaced reliance on an insurance company for timely defense may constitute valid grounds for vacating
default under rule 1.540(b)."
A primary goal of civil procedure is to afford every defendant a just trial
on the merits of his case.7 To this end, Florida courts exercise wide discretion
in opening defaults and vacating default judgments.3 Generally, the courts
tend to exercise this discretion liberally in favor of the moving party, 9 a trend

I. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(a).
2. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(a). This authorizes entry of default order by the clerk without
notice when, as in the instant case, the party has failed to file or serve any paper in the
action. Such orders are temporary only, and should not be confused with final judgments
after default under rule 1.500(e). Courts frequently compound the confusion by terming a
default order a "default judgment." See 271 So. 2d at 137. Other rules authorizing defaults
are FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.150(b), 1.380(b)(2)(iii), 1.380(d), and 1.500(b). Statutes provide for default in specialized situations. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§42.10 (6) (1971) (small claims court); 73.051
(eminent domain); 76.31 (attachment); 77.081 (garnishment). To the extent the statutes
conflict with any rule promulgated by the supreme court, they are superseded. In re Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Revision, 187 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1966).
3. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) provides: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, decree, order
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect ....
" Other grounds for relief specified in this rule include new evidence, fraud,
misrepresentation, misconduct, void judgment, satisfaction, and release.
4. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.030(a) repeals the requirement of an affidavit supporting the motion
to set aside default. Attorneys continue to submit such affidavits, however, and at least one
district court has ignored the rule's effect. See Thomason v. Jernigan, 146 So. 2d 905 (Ist
D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
5. Edwards v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 257 So. 2d 590 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
6. 271 So. 2d at 136, 137.
7. See FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.010.
8. See, e.g., North Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1962). Only a gross
abuse of discretion will justify reversing a trial court's ruling on a motion to vacate. Id. at
852. See also Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., 160 So. 2d 733 (1st D.CA. Fla.
1964).
9. Gordon v. Vaughan, 193 So. 2d 474, 475 (8d D.CA. Fla. 1967); Evans v. Hydeman, 168
So. 2d 183, 189 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
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supported both in supreme court decisionsio and in the amended rules governing relief from default."
Nevertheless, the courts' discretion in default cases is not unlimited. Generally, a default may be opened or final judgment vacated only if the moving
party can tender a meritorious defense and can show he is not guilty of gross
negligence in permitting the default. 1 2 Thus, a meritorious defense and legal
excuse are prerequisites to relief.13 Absence of either element has been held to
4
defeat an attempt to set aside default.'
The first of these conditions, tender of a meritorious defense, is necessary
to prevent a party in default from wasting time by proceeding to trial with a
useless or inadequate defense.' 5 The second condition, legal excuse or absence
of gross negligence in permitting default, may be met by proving one of the
elements in rule 1.540(b), including mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. 16 Instances in which courts have vacated default on one or more
of these grounds include making service on an unauthorized person,' 7 mailing
the answer to a clerk in the wrong county, 8 and filing a motion to dismiss in
lieu of an answer.19 Courts have refused to vacate defaults, however, when a
defendant took no action after being served with process, 20 alleged only that
he had misplaced the summons and complaint, 21 or failed to prove that counsel
was at fault.

2

2

10. E.g., North Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1962); Coggin v. Barfield,
150 Fla. 551, 8 So. 2d 9 (1942); State Bank v. Raymond, 103 Fla. 649, 138 So. 40 (1931).
I.
See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(d) and 1.540(b). The committee note accompanying rule
1.500(d) states: "It is intended that defaults be vacated liberally." Compare Thomason v.
Jernigan, 146 So. 2d 905 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962), decided before the enactment of rule 1.540(b),
with Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., 160 So. 2d 733 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
12. See North Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1962). The North Shore
court emphasized that it was dealing only with interlocutory default orders and not with
the trial court's power to vacate final judgment on default. Id. at 851. However, the committee note accompanying FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(d) implicitly extends the North Shore test
to motions to vacate following entry of final judgment on default.
13. Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., 160 So. 2d 733, 735 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1964). The district courts tend to cite this slightly different but more specific test as the one
governing relief from default. E.g., Empire Elec. Co. v. R.J. Hunt Constr. Co., 264 So. 2d 114,
116 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Somerville v. Skidmore, 175 So. 2d 575, 576 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
14. Chaney v. Headley, 90 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1956); Winter Park Arms, Inc. v. Akerman, 199 So. 2d 107, 108 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
15. See Chaney v. Headley, 90 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1956); State Bank v. Raymond, 108 Fla.
649, 138 So. 40 (1931).
16. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b). See also Florida Inv. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Co., 160
So. 2d 733 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964), which contains a useful catalogue of the factors courts
should consider in determining whether to grant relief from default.
17. F.W. Dodge Co. v. Southern Indus. Say. Bank, 207 So. 2d 516 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
18. Coggin v. Barfield, 150 Fla. 551, 8 So. 2d 9 (1942).
19. Sharpe v. Herman A. Thomas, Inc., 206 So. 2d 655 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
20. Winter Park Arms, Inc. v. Akerman, 199 So. 2d 107 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
21. State ex rel. Benach v. Heffernan, 71 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1954).
22. White v. Spears, 123 So. 2d 689 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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Prior to the instant decision, the leading Florida case dealing with a defaulting party's misplaced reliance on an insurance company was Lawn v.
Wasserman.23 The appellees in Lawn forwarded the suit papers to their insurer's agent but made no further inquiries for almost eight months, long after
entry of default and final judgment. 24 The district court reasoned that vacating default under these circumstances would cast doubt upon the finality of
every judgment entered after default2s Accordingly, it reversed that part of
the order vacating default, holding that misplaced reliance on an insurance
company for timely defense is not excusable neglect by a defendant within
s
the meaning of rule 1.540(b).2
The instant case repudiates Lawn as a generally binding rule27 and aligns
Florida with a majority of jurisdictions holding that the negligence of the insurer should not rigidly be imputed to the defaulting client. 28 Equally important, the decision promotes the intent of rule 1.540(b): a party or his legal
representative should be relieved from default for excusable neglect.29
In several respects, however, the instant case may prove a troublesome
precedent. Particularly misleading is a minority dictum implying that respondent never answered the original complaint charging negligence20 The
majority's silence on this point reinforces the impression that tender of a
meritorious defense-' is no longer a prerequisite to vacating default. Until
clarified, this ambiguity opens the door to use of the relief procedure as an
instrument of harassment or delay.
23. 226 So. 2d 261 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). Cf. Renuart-Bailey-Cheely Lumber & Supply
Co. v. Hall, 264 So. 2d 85 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
24. Lawn v. Wasserman, 226 So. 2d 261, 262 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
25. Id. at 263. Notwithstanding this dictum, the Lawn court affirmed that part of the
order vacating final judgment on the grounds that it resulted from an ex parte trial held
without notice to the appellees. Id. at 264. See also FLA. R. Ctv. P. 1.440(b).
26. Lawn v. Wasserman, 226 So. 2d 261, 262 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
27. 271 So. 2d at 137.
28. E.g., Ellington v. Milne, 14 F.R.D. 241 (E.D.N.C. 1953); Toon v. Pickwick Stages,
N. Div., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 450, 226 P. 628 (2d Dist. 1924); Orange Transp. Co. v. Taylor, 71
Idaho 275, 230 P.2d 689 (1951). Only North Carolina and Oklahoma have consistently refused to sanction a defaulting party's misplaced reliance on his insurance company as
grounds for vacating default. These states tend to regard the insured as a principal, responsible as such for the omissions of his agent-insurer. See, e.g., Milks v. Clark's Greensboro, Inc., 260 N.C. 676, 133 S.E.2d 517 (1963); Franklin v. Hunt Dry Goods Co., 190 Okla,
296, 123 P.2d 258 (1942).
29. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.540(b). Petitioner argued that the non-party insurance company
was never respondent's "legal representative," since respondent neither asserted nor proved
any contractual obligation on the part of insurer to defend the suit. Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 7. After entry of default, however, the insurance company secured the attorney
who represented respondent. Although the principal court never defined "legal representative" within the meaning of rule 1.540(b), its holding supports a broad construction of the
phrase with a view to protecting parties who mistakenly rely on others to prevent the entry
of default.
30. 271 So. 2d at 138 (Dekle, J., dissenting). In fact, respondent had tendered an answer
containing an affirmative defense to the trial judge, and the sufficiency of this defense was
never at issue on appeal. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, 4.
31. See notes 12-15 and accompanying text, supra.
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The instant case also leaves unresolved the extent to which an insured may
rely on his insurer to prevent the entry of default and default judgment. A
number of jurisdictions have refused to vacate defaults against defendants who
32
fail to make further inquiries after forwarding suit papers to their insurer,
3
the view of the Third District Court of Appeal in Lawn v. Wasserman.a The
instant case does not address this aspect of the Lawn decision, but may be
fairly read to absolve a defendant of responsibility once he mails the complaint
to his insurer.3 4
In light of certain district court opinions denying relief from default, the
instant case also raises the problem of differentiating excusable from nonexcusable neglect. The principal court found that administrative error by an
insurer constitutes "excusable neglect" warranting relief from default. 35 In
Cherry v. McClellan,-8 however, the Second District Court of Appeal denied
relief to an individual who had relied on a valid written release signed by
the appellee, in whose name the insurance company as subrogee had brought
suit. These contrasting decisions come perilously close to suggesting a double
standard whereby defaulting individuals are judged more rigorously than
corporate entities. Such inconsistencies tend to obscure the proper application
of judicial discretion in vacating defaults.
By affirming the district court without reprimanding respondent's insurance
carrier, the instant case may foster undue reliance on the rules to escape default or to delay litigation. This is unfortunate, since relief is not a matter of
right.3- Attorneys must demonstrate diligence as a condition precedent to
vacating default; 38 insurance companies should be held to an equal standard
of care. In particular, courts should inquire whether the insurer stands to gain
by postponing litigation in hopes of forcing a more favorable out-of-court
settlement. The rules were not designed to aid those who benefit from their
own negligence.3 9
In construing the rules to secure a just determination of the action on the
merits,4 0 the principal decision is sound. But if suits are to be speedily and
inexpensively resolved, 41 the bench must view the vacating of defaults with a

32. E.g., Till v. Kara, 22 111. App. 2d 502, 161 N.E.2d 363 (1959); Tesea Inv. Corp. v.
Dale, 222 Md. 474, 160 A.2d 920 (1960); Bissonette v. Joseph, 170 S.C. 407, 170 S.E. 467 (1933).
33. 226 So. 2d 261 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
34. Accord, Hinz v. Northland Milk 8: Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 53 N.W.2d 454
(1952); Yannuzzi v. United States Cas. Co., 119 N.J. 201, 115 A.2d 557 (1955).
35. See 271 So. 2d at 138 (Dekle, J., dissenting).
36. 244 So. 2d 168 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971) (Mann, J., dissenting). Cf. Somerville v. Skidmore, 175 So. 2d 575 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965) (motion denied although defendant alleged insufficient funds to hire an attorney).
37. Butler v. Butler, 172 So. 2d 899, 902 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
38. See State ex rel. Benach v. Heffernan, 71 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1954); ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6-1.
39. See Lawn v. Wasserman, 226 So. 2d 261 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
40. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
41. Id. See also Coggin v. Barfield, 150 Fla. 551, 8 So. 2d 9 (1942).
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